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Article
The Miranda Decision is Showing  
Its Age and Should Be Replaced
And Prosecutors Now Have an Argument They Can Make to that Effect
by Paul Cassell
A little over fifty years ago, the Supreme Court handed down 
what may be its most controversial criminal law decision ever 
– Miranda v. Arizona. The decades since then have revealed 
Miranda to be not only bad constitutional law but also bad 
public policy. With the benefit of recent experience and modern 
technology, it is possible to design rules that not only more 
effectively protect legitimate interests of suspects but also insure 
that police are not unduly handcuffed as they investigate crimes.
Contrary to the prevailing myth that is often peddled, Miranda’s 
rules have significantly impeded law enforcement’s ability to 
prosecute dangerous criminals. University of Utah Economics 
Professor Richard Fowles and I have recently assembled all the 
relevant data on the subject. See Paul G. Cassell & Richard 
Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty Years of 
Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law 
Enforcement, 97 Bost. U.L. Rev. 685 (2017). One source of 
information comes from the “before-and-after” studies of 
confession rates in the year or two after the decision. For example, 
a study in Pittsburgh revealed that confession rates fell from 48% 
before the decision to 29% after. Similar results were reported 
in Manhattan, Philadelphia, Kansas City, Brooklyn, New Orleans, 
and Chicago. The few studies to the contrary were done almost 
immediately after Miranda in jurisdictions where police did not 
in fact follow all of the decision’s procedural rules.
It might be argued that this data about Miranda’s harmful 
effects comes in the immediate wake of the decision and that, 
since then, police have learned to “live with” Miranda. But 
surprisingly little hard data has been collected on Miranda’s 
effects. One of the rare exceptions is a study that Bret Hayman 
and I conducted in the mid-1990s of confession rates in Salt 
Lake County. Relying on data collected at the Salt Lake District 
Attorney’s Office, we concluded that police collected incriminating 
statements from suspects in only about 33.3% of criminal cases 
in Salt Lake County – a rate well below confession rates generally 
reported in the country before Miranda. Paul G. Cassell & Bret 
S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical 
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 839, 871 (1996).
Some have argued that this individual study might be an outlier 
because it would be impossible to say whether Salt Lake County’s 
experience was typical of the nation’s. Unfortunately, data on 
confession rates is not routinely collected in this country to 
confirm or dispel this argument. But a surrogate measure for 
confession rates can be found in clearance rates – the rate at 
which police officers solve or “clear” crimes. The FBI collects 
clearance rate data from around the country. And defenders of 
Miranda have argued that clearance rate data shows that police 
were quickly able to develop new techniques that allowed them 
to investigate crimes as successfully after the decision as before.
Unfortunately, the FBI’s clearance rate data depict a different 
pattern. As shown in the accompanying graph, crime clearance 
rates fell immediately after Miranda and have remained 
substantially below pre-Miranda levels ever since.
Professor Fowles and I have extensively analyzed what factors might 
have been responsible for this decline in clearance rates. In our 
article, we report the results of multiple regression equations on 
crime clearance rates from 1950 to 2012, controlling for factors 
apart from Miranda that might be responsible for changes in 
clearance rates. Even controlling for potentially competing factors, 
we find statistically significant reductions in crime clearance 
rates after Miranda for violent and property crimes, as well as 
for robbery, larceny, and vehicle theft – crimes that most likely 
involved “professional” criminals who were most likely to have 
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learned how to take advantage of the Miranda rules. We also 
quantify the number of lost clearances that appear to be due to 
Miranda, concluding that about 200,000 violent crimes and about 
900,000 property crimes might be cleared each year without 
the Miranda requirements. Cassell & Fowles, supra, at 732.
My friend and colleague at the S.J. Quinney College of Law, Professor 
Amos N. Guiora, has recently written a very interesting book discussing 
the legacy of the Miranda decision. In Earl Warren, Ernesto Miranda, 
and Terrorism (Twelve Tables Press 2018), Guiora argues that Chief 
Justice Warren would pay scant attention to such empirical evidence 
of the calamitous effects that his narrowly divided (5–4) decision 
had on the nation. In this historical assessment, Guiora is likely 
correct. When he authored the decision, Chief Justice Warren 
blithely minimized the warnings of his dissenting colleagues. 
For example, Justice Harlan warned, “I believe the decision of 
the Court…entails harmful consequences for the country at 
large. How serious these consequences may prove to be only 
time can tell.…The social costs of crime are too great to call 
the new rules anything but a hazardous experimentation.” 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 504, 517 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In reviewing Miranda’s legacy, Professor Guiora gamely attempts to 
credit Miranda with reducing police brutality. But the available 
data do not support any such linkage. For example, Professor 
Gerald Rosenberg has comprehensively reviewed the issue, 
concluding that “[e]vidence is hard to come by but what 
evidence there is suggests that any reductions that have been 
achieved in police brutality are independent of the Court and 
started before Miranda.” Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow 
Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 326 (1991).
Professor Guiora also refers to Miranda as a “necessary evil.” 
But the Miranda rules are not the only way to approach issues 
concerning police questioning. Indeed, in the Miranda opinion 
itself, Chief Justice Warren (at the suggestion of Justice Brennan) 
stated that the decision “in no way creates a constitutional 
straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform” and that 
the Court “encourage[d] Congress and the States to continue their 
laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the 
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of 
our criminal laws.” Id. at 467. Just as in other endeavors of 
modern life, we have learned a great deal over the last fifty years 
that could be used to effectively reform the Miranda rules.
One thing that we have learned is that Miranda, if anything, 
exacerbates the problem of false confessions. Miranda offers 
essentially no protection to vulnerable innocent persons who 
erroneously fall under police suspicion, such as intellectually 
disabled suspects. Such persons typically eagerly waive their 
Miranda rights and may ultimately, in some rare cases, be 
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clearance rate data above suggest, professional criminals are the 
most likely to invoke Miranda questioning cut-off rules, blocking 
any questioning whatsoever. As many academics who have closely 
studied Miranda have concluded, the upshot is that Miranda’s 
rules “shielded some savvy, guilty recidivists while doing little to 
protect the [intellectually disabled], juveniles, and other innocent 
defendants most likely to confess.” Stephanos Bibas, The Right 
to Remain Silent, 158 U. PA. L. Rev. PenumBRa 69, 77 (2010). 
Indeed, it seems likely that by diverting judicial attention towards 
procedural issues of Miranda compliance and away from 
underlying “voluntariness” questions, Miranda has affirmatively 
harmed vulnerable persons who have given false confessions.
One solution to such problems is to videotape police interrogations, 
as many commentators have recognized. Electronic recording of 
interrogations allows later judicial review to more powerfully detect 
false confessions and inappropriate police techniques that are 
sometimes hard to review without an objective record. Interestingly, 
many police agencies (including Utah agencies) currently electronically 
record interrogations, subject to certain limited exceptions. 
Videorecording provides far more protection against coercive 
tactics and “false” confessions than the Miranda rules ever did.
In a case where police interrogation has been recorded, prosecutors 
in Utah and elsewhere should consider advancing parallel arguments 
to trial courts. In addition to the standard arguments about Miranda 
compliance or inapplicability, prosecutors should also argue 
that the Miranda regime is no longer necessary to satisfy the 
requirements of the Fifth Amendment. As noted above, Miranda 
itself encouraged the states to explore other ways to protect 
suspects’ rights. Electronic recording is such a means. And, since 
1966, a whole host of changes have occurred in American policing, 
such as greater training and professionalization, that means that 
any arguable need for such rules is much weaker today.
Excluding reliable evidence should always be a last resort. As Justice 
Lee recently explained in connection with the search and seizure 
exclusionary rule, “[I]ts bottom-line effect, in many cases, is to 
suppress the truth and set the criminal loose in the community 
without punishment.” State v. Rowan, 2017 UT 88, ¶ 52, 416 P.3d 
566 (Lee, J., concurring). Where a defendant seeks to exclude his or 
her voluntary confession under Miranda, suppressing the confession 
can similarly lead to a miscarriage of justice. Contrary to Professor 
Guiora’s suggestion, a court rule like Miranda that automatically and 
often arbitrarily excludes a confession, without regard to its reliability 
or voluntariness, by definition favors criminals over victims.
With its historical focus, Professor Guiora’s article harkens back 
to the turmoil of the 1960s, when Chief Justice Warren engaged 
in what has to be regarded as the paradigm example of judicial 
legislation. But in the decades since Warren penned Miranda, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Miranda rules are 
not themselves constitutional rights but are mere “prophylactic 
safeguards” – presumably subject to appropriate modification by 
Congress or the states. To be sure, in one post-Miranda case, the 
Supreme Court rejected an argument that a sufficient alternative 
had been put in place of the Miranda rules. That was Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), a case I argued to the Supreme 
Court. But in that case, the alternative to Miranda was, according 
to the Dickerson majority, nothing other than a federal statute 
authorizing a return to the pre-Miranda voluntariness rules. 
Videotaping, of course, is not something that was mandated (or 
even readily available) before Miranda. Thus, a prosecutor could 
make a very strong alternative argument that videotaping (along 
with other safeguards) serves as a legitimate substitute for the 
prophylactic Miranda requirements under the U.S. Constitution. 
And in Utah (as in many other states), the state constitution has never 
been interpreted as imposing the novel Miranda requirements as a 
matter of state constitutional law. See State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 
743 (Utah 1997) (“‘[T]his Court has never specifically held that 
Miranda-type warnings are required under the Utah Constitution’”.) 
(citation omitted).
Videotaping deters genuine police misconduct more effectively than 
Miranda by creating a clear record of police and suspect demeanor 
during questioning. To be sure, police can turn off videocameras or 
deploy force off-camera. But if you were facing a police officer with 
a rubber hose, would you prefer a world in which he was required 
to mumble the Miranda warnings and have you give some form of 
waiver of rights (all proven by his later testimony)? Or a world in 
which the interrogation is videorecorded, where your physical 
appearance and demeanor during any “confession” are permanently 
recorded, where date and time are electronically stamped on 
the tape? Videotaping is the clear winner.
In closing, I agree with Professor Guiora that protecting constitutional 
rights is as important in 2018 as it was in 1966. But it is folly to 
think that the unprecedented rules Chief Justice Warren thought 
would best serve the country at the time should remain frozen in 
time as the only way to address constitutional issues involved in police 
questioning. More than fifty years later, prosecutors in Utah and 
elsewhere can now argue that, with more modern tools like 
videotaping often available and more professional police training 
for law enforcement officers, a different world exists. This legal 
regime still requires that police refrain from coercive tactics that 
obtain involuntary statements. But when police have obtained a 
clearly voluntary statement from a suspect as documented by 
videorecorded evidence, the technical Miranda rules should be 
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Miranda v. Arizona:  
Pain Management: Protecting the Vulnerable
by Amos N. Guiora
Interrogations reflect an imbalance between the interrogator 
and suspect, a nitty-gritty confluence of fear, anxiety, and control. 
My “counter-point” to Professor Cassell’s thoughtful and well 
argued “point” reflecting path-breaking empirical research that has 
drawn, justifiably, wide commentary, focuses on interrogations 
from the suspect’s perspective. That is in accordance with the 
essence of the holding in Miranda v. Arizona.
Chief Justice Earl Warren emphasized the vulnerability of the individual 
in the inherently coercive environment of an interrogation. For Warren, 
as for me, the power, importance, and centrality of Miranda is the 
focus on protecting the constitutional rights of the vulnerable 
individual. That is the theme of this counterpoint; I believe this approach 
most accurately represents what J Warren believed and wrote in 
as clear a language as possible. Warren’s holding guaranteed the 
protection of a right guaranteed in the Constitution to an individual.
Any proposed weakening of Miranda, beyond the Quarles 
exception, would represent unwarranted evisceration; while 
body cams or any other technological tools are doubtlessly 
valuable, they must not come in the place of the interrogator’s 
clear articulation to the suspect of his/her Miranda rights.
I am of the opinion that these words are amongst the most 
important ever penned in a Supreme Court decision. As simple 
as they are, they are majestic.
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say 
can and will be used against you in a court of law. 
You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford 
an attorney, one will be provided for you. Do you 
understand the rights I have just read to you? With 
these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?
Introduction:
To solve a crime, the interrogator needs information. The 
essence of police work is gathering information, collecting 
evidence, connecting various dots, and then determining who is 
responsible for violating the law. There is nothing magical about 
this. While contemporary methods are more sophisticated, 
more scientifically based and, hopefully, more objective than in 
years past, the critical interaction is between the two individuals.
As Earl Warren fully understood, that relationship is at the epicenter 
of criminal law and procedure. The interrogator wants the truth. 
That is the purest form of law enforcement in the ideal. What 
Warren feared was an interrogator who wants a confession and 
for the suspect to incriminate himself or herself and say, “I did 
it” regardless of the truth. That is an interrogator who coerces a 
confession from the suspect.
If there is one word that captures the interrogation paradigm it is 
“coercive.” While the environment is not intended to resemble 
comfort and leisure, the question is to what degree does the 
suspect have to be coerced before confessing. The environment 
– in its totality – is coercive. Coercion is inherent to interrogation. 
The physicality is obvious and telling. The suspect is handcuffed. 
The suspect is accused of having committed a crime.
Miranda v. Arizona
Chief Justice Earl Warren sought to protect the vulnerable; he 
clearly understood the realities of the interrogation paradigm. 
Warren, based on his experiences as a District Attorney, was 
fully cognizant of the inherent imbalance between the interrogator 
and the suspect. As the opinion made clear, Warren recognized 
interrogations are inherently coercive.
His motivations were simultaneously simple and profound; simple 
in that he wanted to protect suspects, profound in that he imposed 
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limits on how the nation state interacted with vulnerable 
individuals. That is, in protecting those suspected of criminal 
activity, Warren sent a clear message to law enforcement and 
society. That message, while focusing on the specific individual, also 
had powerful consequences regarding the larger society.
The opinion was not written in a vacuum; America in 1966 was in 
turmoil. The Harlem and Watts riots of 1964 and 1965 dramatically 
and violently highlighted profound anger, resentment, and social 
injustice. The Detroit and Newark riots in 1967 and the riots that 
followed the assassination of Dr. King in 1968 were extremely 
violent, resulting in significant loss of life, requiring intervention 
by the U.S. military. In between those two “book-ends,” Earl 
Warren’s Supreme Court imposed limits on law enforcement.
While law enforcement loudly complained that the decision 
“handcuffed” police officers, Earl Warren believed protecting 
the individual was paramount. The tension between these two 
perspectives must be acknowledged. It would not be an 
exaggeration to use the phrase “necessary evil” in describing 
how Miranda is perceived in certain quarters.
There is no indication Detective Carroll Cooley pressured or coerced 
Ernesto Miranda during the course of the interrogation. Arguably, 
that was a strategic decision by Warren: there was nothing unusual or 
extraordinary in how Miranda was interrogated; it was a run-of-the-mill 
interrogation conducted in the aftermath of a crime with nothing 
to indicate its uniqueness. Miranda was not subject to a violent, 
physical interrogation conjured up in images of sheriff deputies 
beating African-American suspects in the back seat.
Viewing the case in that context increases the power of the 
holding; were Miranda the victim of a back-seat beating then it 
would be possible to dismiss the opinion suggesting, “of course 
the suspect has to be protected; otherwise, he’ll come within a 
whisker of a brutal death.” That dismissiveness cannot be 
applied given how Cooley interrogated Miranda. The facts of 
Miranda’s interrogation lent themselves to Warren’s decision to 
“use” Miranda as the platform to extend Escobedo.
It is not by chance that Warren penned the opinion himself. 
Unlike his fellow justices, Warren had been elected to serve as 
district attorney and had intimate knowledge of the interrogation 
paradigm.1 The opinion is neither complex nor sophisticated; it 
is written in a manner that any member of the public and law 
enforcement can easily understand. There is no hidden ball and 
no “between the lines” analysis required to comprehend its full 
import. This was a clear directive; this was not the time or place 
for nuance. The message was unequivocal.
For Warren, the most effective way to protect the suspect was to 
inform the suspects that they had the right to remain silent and 
that, if need be, an attorney would be provided. The obligation 
imposed on the interrogator was two-fold: to read the suspect 
the warning and to ensure that the suspect understood the rights 
granted. Whether the suspect chose to exercise the right or to 
“waive” was a personal decision. To be made by the suspect.
The decision represents recognition of the mistreatment of 
suspects throughout history. That is an extraordinarily 
important acknowledgment both for the specific suspect and for 
the relationship between the state and the individual. The 
decision is powerful on a micro and macro scale alike.
Protecting the suspect was essential.
There is no doubt Warren was fully aware of the injustices that had 
been visited upon suspects over the years. In establishing a rights-based 
interrogation regime, Warren was also protecting larger society 
from the consequences of confessions elicited from mistreated 
suspects. Warren was concerned about the lack of professionalism 
amongst police departments; he believed coerced confessions 
reflected laziness amongst police officers. In addition, coerced 
confessions resulted in wrongful convictions. The consequences 
from all perspectives were, for Warren, deeply troubling.
In establishing the Miranda warnings, Warren and the four 
justices who joined him took a clear and bold stand regarding 
interrogations. Admittedly long, the opinion explains the core issue 
in a manner that left no doubt as to the writer’s intention. The 
language is neither soaring nor particularly elegant. The prose 
is not of a poet; Warren was neither bard nor man of letters. The 
directness conveys a powerful message to interrogators: ENOUGH.
Emphasizing the suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination was the cornerstone of the decision; the 
“right to remain silent” is the practical, jurisprudential, and 
existential core of the opinion. For Warren, protecting that 
constitutionally guaranteed privilege was of the essence. It is not 
an exaggeration to suggest that, for Warren, it was sacrosanct. 
The opinion must be read accordingly.
The centerpiece of the decision was ensuring the suspect be 
protected from state agents.
That does not mean, as some have suggested, that Warren 
minimized harm caused to the victim of a crime. I believe that 
to be a spurious charge. One must not forget that Warren well 
understood victims’ pain; his own father had been murdered. 
Warren was sympathetic to the victim; however, he differentiated 
between the victim’s unquestioned harm and suffering and the 
individual suspected of having committed the crime in question.
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The difference is significant: the victim was clearly identified, the 
suspect but a suspect. Protecting the rights of the latter does not, 
in any way, trivialize or disrespect the suffering of the former. To 
suggest that Warren preferred one over the other or was more 
sympathetic to suspects than to victims is erroneous. It also 
significantly misses the point of the opinion and what was of 
grave concern to the majority. The opinion was neither victim 
“unfriendly” nor suspect “friendly.” That is to miss the point. 
Rather, Earl Warren, as Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
sought to ensure that basic constitutional rights were protected 
in the interrogation setting and that law enforcement respected 
the rights of the suspect.
Below are excerpts from the opinion which Warren read in its 
entirety on June 13, 1966.
The cases before us raise questions which go to the 
roots of our concepts of American criminal 
jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe 
consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting 
individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with 
the admissibility of statements obtained from an 
individual who is subjected to custodial police 
interrogation and the necessity for procedures 
which assure that the individual is accorded his 
privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 
not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning 
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person 
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived 
of his freedom of action in any significant way.
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned 
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement 
he does make may be used as evidence against him, 
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, 
either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive 
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is 
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, 
however, he indicates in any manner and at any 
stage of the process that he wishes to consult with 
an attorney before speaking, there can be no 
questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and 
indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be 
interrogated, the police may not question him. The 
mere fact that he may have answered some questions 
or volunteered some statements on his own does not 
deprive him of the right to refrain from answering 
any further inquiries until he has consulted with an 
attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
The constitutional issue we decide in each of these 
cases is the admissibility of statements obtained 
from a defendant questioned while in custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way.
Who is in Control: What Needs Protection?
Control is critical to understanding interrogation. Who controls, 
who is controlled. The struggle is intense, intensive, high-stakes, 
and constant. That is fair enough and not surprising. The 
question is whether the “game” is played within acceptable 
rules and boundaries.
As Warren wrote, interrogations were inherently coercive, and 
suspects had to be protected. Warren did not say “all” detectives 
violated suspect rights for that would be an unjustified exaggeration, 
casting unwarranted aspersions on the law enforcement 
community; he did, however, make it crystal clear that how 
interrogations were conducted had to change. And the change 
that was required had one intention: to protect the suspect 
whose rights, according to Warren, must be protected.
Did Warren anger detectives? Safe to assume. Were “clean” 
detectives made to feel “guilty”? Probably. Was the public angry? 
Certainly, a segment. No doubt about that.
In describing interrogations as coercive, Warren threw the 
gauntlet down.
For all the seeming fairness, protection, and process that 
appear to be in place, the reality is the following: The suspect 
exercises little, if any control, in the interrogation setting. That’s 
just the way it is.2
That lack of control, the dependence on the interrogator, the 
inability to withstand pressure – whether real or imagined – is 
what defines the interrogation setting.
Protecting constitutional rights is as important in 2018 as in 1966.
Protecting a suspect’s rights is as important in 2018 as it was 
in 1966.
Based on my research, I am convinced CJ Warren would 
wholeheartedly concur with both conclusions.
1. Justice Tom Clark served as an assistant district attorney, https://www.oyez.org/
justices/tom_c_clark.
2. For more on interrogations, see: Wrongful Convictions, Rights Violated During 
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